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Abstract 
Behavioral Theory explains that organizational change is prompted by performance relative to a 
firm-specific aspiration. While this explanation has been empirically confirmed, it has not been 
tested comparatively alongside other explanations, most notably rational choice. This lack of 
comparative study implies that prior research may be committing Type I errors – confirming 
aspiration-level decision-making when it is not actually occurring. The paper contributes to 
behavioral theory in two specific ways. First, it is shown that several foundational studies 
purporting to provide empirical support for aspiration level decision-making may actually 
represent maximizing behavior. To consider this potential, a sample of subjectively rational 
agents is simulated who choose strategies by maximizing expectations. It is shown that they can 
be perceived as satisficing, even when aspirations are absent from the data. Second, 
recommendations for comparative testing are developed and implemented to demonstrate their 
reliability. Analysis of simulated data shows the recommendations are effective at reducing Type 
I and Type II errors for both behavioral theory and rational choice. The paper has strong 
implications for the design of future studies on aspirations, and indeed, all studies of 
organizational change. 
 
1.  Introduction 
It has been frequently argued that managers satisfice in their decision-making. In contrast to 
most models of rational choice where the best alternative is selected, Cyert and March (1992: 
134) emphasize that their theory of organizational decision-making assumes:  
… an approximate sequential consideration of alternatives. The 
first satisfactory alternative evoked is accepted . . .   
where firm-specific performance aspirations determine what is “satisfactory”. This view suggests 
firms use aspirations to dictate change behavior, and a growing body of empirical work claims to 
find evidence of this theory. However, the vast majority of confirmations fail to consider 
alternative explanations. The danger, of course, is Type I error, also known as a false positive, 
which occurs when a theory is confirmed yet is not true.1 To avoid this grave danger, the method 
of multiple working hypotheses is advocated, where theories are tested comparatively. 
                                                      
1  The rate of Type I error is usually denoted by the Greek letter α, and usually equals the significance level of a test. 
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Comparative testing refers to the systematic consideration of alternative explanations to a 
phenomena, as Kuhn (1970: 146) emphasizes: “. . . confirmation or verification is not a relation 
between a theory and evidence, but a process of selection from amongst rival candidates,” and as 
Stinchcombe (1968:20) argues, stating that a strong test of theory requires researchers to 
“consider the alternative theories which might be explanations” for the observed phenomena. 
When implemented rigorously, comparative testing disciplines researchers not to unduly fasten 
their affections (Chamberlin, 1931; Kuhn, 1970). While multiple theories of organizational 
change exist beyond behavioral theory, one obvious alternative to managers’ satisficing around 
aspirations is rationally maximizing around expectations.   
One should not be dissuaded from comparative testing even though “it is difficult to 
differentiate maximizing from satisficing” because “most decisions are interpretable in either 
way” (March and Heath,1994: 20-21). In this sense, this work is different from Lant (1992: 641) 
who is interpreted as being unconcerned about her conclusion that “there may be a close 
relationship (emphasis added) between expectations and aspirations.” If there is a likelihood of 
collinearity between the constructs then it is premature to assume that either perspective is well-
supported unless empiricists simultaneously test both hypotheses. Without comparatively testing 
one explanation against the other, it is unclear whether one perspective dominates the other, or if 
both add explanatory power. A review suggests that “a sizeable empirical research stream” 
(Argote and Greve, 2007: 343) on aspirations ignores comparative testing against the expectation 
hypothesis. This disregard is clearly at odds with philosophies of Kuhn (1970), Lakatos (1974), 
and Stinchcombe (1968), who emphasize the power in being comparative.2 It also contrasts with 
                                                      
2 Some schools of philosophy disagree on the necessity of comparative testing. For example, relativists believe alternative 
theories can peacefully co-exist if they describe a phenomenon equally well, but have different causal mechanisms. Lakatos 
(1974) has criticized this position because it requires certainty about the independence of those explanations.  
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the founders of the satisficing view (Cyert and March, 1963; Simon 1997b) who recognize 
theoretical uniqueness hinges on whether empiricists can discern if maximizing or satisficing 
best describe managerial decision-making.3  
In response to this premise, this study contributes to the literature in two important ways. 
First, it is demonstrated that several foundational studies purporting to provide empirical support 
for aspiration level decision-making--those of Lant and Montgomery (1987), Lant (1992), Greve, 
(1998), and Mezias et al. (2002)--may actually represent maximizing behavior. To consider this 
potential, simulation is used to develop a sample of agents who choose strategies by maximizing 
expectations. It is shown that the agents may be perceived as satisficing, even when aspirations 
are absent from the data. A plethora of robustness tests, confirm it is remarkably easy to confirm 
satisficing behavior when the true causality is rational choice. These findings clearly do not 
invalidate prior research, but strongly imply that empiricists who study organizational change 
through the lens of aspirations need more explicitly to rule out maximization as an alternative 
explanation for their findings.  
Second, recommendations for comparative testing are offered and implemented to 
demonstrate their reliability. Again, simulation is valuable because the true causality is known, 
making it possible to ascertain whether the recommendations are effective at the elimination of 
Type I and Type II errors for both behavioral theory and rational choice. To accomplish this, the 
recommendations are examined across three scenarios--when causality is maximizing, when it is 
satisficing, and when a mixture of maximizing and satisficing is occurring. While this focus on 
simulated data does not illuminate evidence in favor of any one theory, it does demonstrate 
                                                      
3  Simon (1997b: 22) argues “. . . empirical evidence . . .  would determine which theory is the correct one.” In relation to the 
behavioral theory they develop, Cyert and March (1992: 177) explain “the adequacy of the theory is tested by using it as a basis 
for decisions and comparing the result with the result obtained from decisions derived from alternatives rules.”   
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sophisticated techniques built soundly upon theory which then can be practically implemented 
for comparative testing in non-simulated, real world contexts. This final effort provides a 
roadmap for future research that seeks to understand the boundary conditions of both theories. 
To be clear, this paper is not challenging the theoretical uniqueness of behavioral theory. 
Rather, theoretical uniqueness is assumed, and the focus is on empirical discrimination. 
However, it is important to emphasize that the theoretical implications of comparative testing are 
consequential. Chamberlin (1931: 163-164) advocates several benefits to comparative testing 
beyond empirical discrimination. They “whet the discriminative edge of each” theory, which 
tends to sharpen the analytic process by specifying more closely the criteria differentiating the 
hypotheses. They promote “fertility” in research processes, as “each hypothesis suggests its own 
criteria, its own means of proof, its own method of developing the truth; and if a group of 
hypotheses encompass the subject on all sides, the total outcome of means and of methods is full 
and rich.”  Finally, they urge discipline in not emotionally fixing one’s attention or devotion 
unduly on a single theoretical explanation. Thus, comparatively testing whether change is guided 
by satisficing or maximizing behavior will amplify and clarify the scope of each hypothesis. 
While some find offensive our targeting of satisficing behavior, this focus is consistent with the 
aim of contributing to a target audience: scholars who research organizations.  
 
2. Discriminating Between Alternative Rationalizations of Organizational Change 
Argote and Greve (2007: 343) argue that the theory in Cyert and March (1963):  
most directly predicts organizational search and change.  
Problemistic search implies that organizational aspiration levels 
adapt to the past experience of the focal organization and those of 
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comparable organizations.  Once organizational performance falls 
below the aspiration level, search for solutions will occur and 
organizational changes become more likely.  
This theory has become a leading theory to explain organizational change and its 
empirical predictions have received “good support” (Argote and Greve, 2007: 343).4 The 
literature yields findings nearly universally consistent with the theoretical propositions of 
behavioral theory (BT) and suggests that past performance, past aspirations, and past 
performance of comparable firms determine their aspirations; furthermore, organizational change 
is predicted by the relationship of performance to historical or social aspirations. Moreover, 
evidence suggests the likelihood of change is not symmetric around the deviation of performance 
from aspirations—performance above aspirations induces a greater likelihood of change. 
A meaningful test of BT, and specifically the role of aspirations in organizational change, 
requires that it be considered against alternative explanations of the phenomena. The most likely 
alternative is that organizational change is guided by rational choice (RC)—firms viewed as 
unitary actors selecting alternatives that maximize expected utility.5 Comparative testing 
between BT and RC is not a trivial exercise, partly because considerable theoretical overlap may 
exist between them. Simon (1978: 503) emphasizes that “In long-run equilibrium it might even 
be the case that choice with dynamically adapting aspiration levels would be equivalent to 
optimal choice, taking the costs of search into account.” Schwartz et al. (2002: 1178) argue “A 
satisficer thus often moves in the direction of maximization without ever having it as a deliberate 
                                                      
4  Reviews of empirical studies on organizational aspirations can be found in Greve (2003) and Nickel and Rodriguez (2002). 
5  It is doubtful that anyone would disagree with this claim. Cyert and March (1992) criticize the RC approach, and explicitly 
challenge the maximization hypothesis. That the challenge is without potential for compromise is manifested in two ideas they 
express: (1) an assumption of “an approximate sequential consideration of alternatives” (p. 134) rather than a simultaneous 
consideration of multiple alternatives, and (2) their conclusion that decision processes are “dominated in large part by non-
expectational factors” (p. 75). Note that the decision heuristic described by Cyert and March (1963) differs from that offered by 
Simon (1997a) and March and Simon (1959). As indicated, an entire body of theoretical and empirical work has followed with 
the decision heuristic developed by Cyert and March (1963), so it is this heuristic on which this paper is focused. 
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goal.” Cyert and DeGroot (1974: 522) raise concerns about the theoretical and empirical 
uniqueness of expectations from social aspirations. “Because formulating the alternative theories 
and deriving their consequences is preeminently a theoretical task,” (Stinchcombe, 1968: 28) it is 
important to clarify what constitutes maximizing behavior in RC and satisficing behavior in BT. 
Subsequent to the clarification is an evaluation of how the empirical literature distinguishes 
between satisficing and maximizing.  
2.1  Subjective Rationality as an Alternative to Behavioral Theory 
The decision heuristic common to every characterization of RC is maximization – agents prefer 
the alternative providing the highest utility, and will change to that alternative from status quo if 
doing so provides a higher expected utility. Satisficers are unconcerned about comparing utilities 
across alternatives. They focus on whether current performance is satisfactory relative to aspired 
performance, and if it is not they change to the first available alternative. This paper emphasizes 
the need for comparative testing of whether these heuristics lead to fundamentally different 
outcomes. As described in the previous paragraph, it is not obvious that they should.  
 The challenge of comparatively testing RC and BT is enhanced by our inability to know 
with certainty how expectations or aspirations are determined by agents. It is therefore necessary 
to make instrumental assumptions about the formation of expectations and aspirations. For 
example, Simon (1997a: 84) recognizes that we might assume that agents are objectively rational 
in that they maximize based on complete knowledge and perfect processing capabilities, or we 
might assume them to be subjectively rational by maximizing attainment relative to their actual 
knowledge.6 Similarly, we might assume what performance is deemed “satisfactory” to be based 
on a complete history of performance or weighted more heavily on recent histories, or it might 
                                                      
6 Objectively rational agents might also consider of their rival’s likely responses, as epitomized in game theory.  
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be based on historical or social comparisons. Since it is necessary to make instrumental 
assumptions to implement a comparative test, one should be careful to clearly denote the 
assumptions underlying their characterization of the comparative theories to demarcate the 
applicability of their test. We choose to implement comparative tests between BT and subjective 
rationality, as defined by Simon (1997a), and consistent with Arrow (1951) and Sen (1997).7 
This choice was made partly because it is preferable to comparatively test a more general 
interpretation of theory (Stinchcombe, 1968), and partly because of the extraordinary 
computational complexities associated with imparting perfect knowledge and processing 
capabilities on a sample of numerous and heterogeneous agents. It is essential to emphasize that 
subjectively rational agents maximize with the information they possess – they do not 
intentionally satisfice. The specific ways in which subjectively rational behavior and satisficing 
behavior are instrumented is described more carefully in later sections.  
2.2  An Absence of Comparative Tests Between Satisficing and Maximizing 
Graham Allison (1969) was one of the first to explicitly compare how organizational change 
might be driven by either changes in expectations or changes in performance relative to 
aspirations. He emphasized how BT and RC differentially explain events around the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, but seemed uninterested in comparatively testing which theory best explained the 
events.8 There is no evidence of any serious challenges to aspiration-based reasoning with RC 
reasoning, such as would be the case in the presence of comparative testing. Some work has 
                                                      
7  Simon (1997a: 84) specifically refers to a decision being “subjectively rational if it maximizes attainment relative to the actual 
knowledge of the subject.” Arrow (1951: 406) described “rational behavior simply means behavior in accordance with some 
ordering of alternatives in terms of relative desirability,” and Sen (1997: 746) suggests that maximization “only requires choosing 
an alternative that is not judged to be worse than any other.” Note that these three Nobel laureates place maximization at the 
center of their descriptions of rationality. There is no requirement that agents have complete knowledge.  
8 It is noteworthy that Allison (1969: 694) also recognized that maximization was the fundamental RC proposition:  “An increase 
[/a decrease] in the cost of an alternative, i.e., a reduction [/an increase] in the value of the set of consequences which will follow 
from that action, or a reduction [/an increase] in the probability of attaining fixed consequences, reduces [/increases] the 
likelihood of that alternative being chosen.”  
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acknowledged the potential for RC to explain the observed outcome, but these studies fall 
considerably short of a comparative test. For example, Lant and Montgomery (1987), Greve 
(1998), and Iyer and Miller (2008), admit organizational change can be described through the 
lens of RC, but they ultimately reason it is unlikely for their empirical contexts (Markstrat 
simulations, radio broadcasting, and acquisitions, respectively). Pertinent is the advice of 
Camerer and Weber (1999: 62), who explain that comparative tests are most effectively made 
“with data that clearly rule out an alternative hypothesis than with mere reason and argument.” 
The most direct attempt to consider RC alongside BT is the work of Lant (1992). She was 
interested in determining whether sales targets in the Markstrat game are better predicted by 
rational expectations or by attainment discrepancy (performance relative to aspirations). She 
considered two attainment discrepancy models: that of Lewin et al. (1944), which focuses on 
aspirations of individuals, and that of Levinthal and March (1981), which characterizes 
organizational aspirations. Lant (1992) found that the model of Lewin et al. (1944) predicted 
sales targets better than the model of Levinthal and March (1981) or the RC model. Interestingly, 
she did find that under certain conditions, the attainment discrepancy models and the RC model 
converged in their predictive ability, suggesting that, under those circumstances, a strong 
correlation may exist between aspirations and expectations. Despite her contributions, for three 
reasons this work fails to conduct a comparative test between BT and RC. First, it does not test 
the key proposition that attainment discrepancy predicts organizational change, and instead 
focuses on predicting sales targets because they are believed to represent aspirations. Second, if 
whether or not sales targets actually represent aspirations or expectations is ambiguous, then the 
finding that attainment discrepancy models best fit the data does not necessarily mean that sales 
targets represent aspirations. The correct conclusion ultimately hinges on how accurately the 
RATIONALIZING ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
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models characterize the theory. Lant (1992) implicitly adopted an assumption that expectations 
could not be adapted based on performance relative to prior expectations. While scholars 
sometimes disallow adaptive expectations to facilitate model convergence, it is important to 
recognize that adaptive expectations might easily be instrumented in RC. Nobel laureate Kenneth 
Arrow (1971: 171) states that the “observer of the outcome of an activity can be supposed to 
form new probability judgements,” and Cyert and DeGroot (1974) provide one example of how 
expectations are adapted by new information. Surprisingly, Lant (1992:627) recognizes that 
“organization theorists have adopted models of adaptive expectations from the economic 
literature,” but she does not incorporate such adaptation in her own test of RC. Finally, while her 
Markstrat players have two alternative brands around which she predicts sales targets, she 
estimates separate models for each brand. By doing so, her estimation treats the sales targets of 
the brands as independent of one another, a conclusion in clear opposition of the maximization 
behavior based on comparative expectations. Consequently, the participants of the game might 
have maximized in their choice over relative quantities of the two goods. 
In light of Lant’s (1992) finding that predictions using aspirations and expectations may 
converge, the fact that no paper explicitly rules out maximizing behavior is surprising. The 
closest attempt at doing so seems to be the work of Iyer and Miller (2008) who study how 
aspirations affect the hazard of acquisition. They include the acquirer’s market-to-book ratio to 
proxy for its growth options, which might be interpreted as an attempt to control for available 
alternatives. Curiously, their finding that the probability of acquisition decreases with 
performance below aspirations contradicts the view that change behavior is driven by 
problemistic search, advocated by BT.  
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To summarize, despite recognition that BT and RC are competing explanations for 
change, the empirical literature fails to explicitly compare BT against its most probable 
theoretical competitor (RC). This oversight raises concern as to whether confirmations of 
aspiration-level decision-making are false positive confirmations, also known as Type I errors, 
resulting from a spurious relationship where the true causality may be maximizing. In Section 3 
this concern is empirically examined. For this purpose, simulation has one key advantage relative 
to studies of real data–the true causality is known because it is determined ex ante. 
3. Is it Possible to Diagnose Satisficing When Maximizing is Occurring? 
This section investigates the potential for committing a Type I error by falsely confirming BT 
when it is not true.  We do so by: 
• simulating a sample of subjectively rational agents (firms) that maximize in their 
decision-making by estimating performance expectations for each alternative;	  
• inferring aspirations from the subjectively rational agents–it is common to empirically 
derive aspirations and identify them to be behavioral, but when using these same 
methods to identify aspirations it is known there is nothing behavioral about them 
because agents are predetermined to be maximizers; 	  
• fitting the simulated data to models purporting to provide foundational support for 
aspiration-level decision-making to observe whether Type I errors obtain in the 
simulated data, indicating that BT is confirmed when the true causality is RC; and	  
• ascertaining how robust Type I errors appear in the simulated data.      	  
This process reveals that Type I errors in research confirming BT may be consequential. Section 
4 develops recommendations for overcoming Type I and Type II errors in BT and RC.  
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3.1.   Simulating a Sample of Subjectively Rational Agents Who Maximize 
Simulation is used to predict change among a population of agents. Change is simulated through 
rational choice, implemented via expected utility maximization as specified by Arrow (1971) and 
Pratt (1964), where utility is a function of wealth. One redeeming quality of this approach is that 
enables quantification of utilities across a wide range of risk attitudes. Since expected outcomes 
matter differently to agents with different risk attitudes, quantification is valuable for 
ascertaining change behavior. One key element of the model is agents are randomly endowed 
with one of five risk attitudes as noted in Appendix A, three types of risk averse utilities and two 
types of risk seeking utilities. The other two key elements to the model are the calculation of 
actual and expected utilities. Expected utilities are important since they dictate strategy choice.  
3.1.1  Calculating Actual Utilities 
In the model, each agent i gets utility, Uijt, for participating in strategy j at time t, where 
    (1), 
indicating that utility is a function of wealth, Wijt. Wijt is determined by wealth at the beginning of 
a period (Wit-1), the cost of switching strategies (S) when a switch happens, and an agent’s 
income under a strategy (Iijt). All agents are assigned zero wealth in the first period. S is 
randomly drawn from the distribution U (0, 0.01) for each run of the simulation, but within a run 
is invariant across time or strategy. Iijt is determined by random variables D1t, D2t, D3t, D4t, and D5t 
representing the population’s income for each of the five strategies. Djt is shared equally by all njt 
agents choosing the strategy based on expectations (equation 2 below), such that Iijt=Ijt= Djt/njt. 
In period 1, each Dj1 is randomly drawn from the uniform distribution U(0, 5). Every period 
thereafter, each Djt is adjusted by uncertainty δjt, drawn for each strategy from distribution U (-λ, 
λ), and λ is a parameter drawn once in the beginning of each run from distribution U (0,10). 
€ 
Uijt =U(Wijt ) =U(Wit−1 − S + Iijt )
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Thus, Iijt is determined by the initial draw for a strategy (Dj1), the exogenous uncertainty for a 
strategy each period (δjt), and the number of agents choosing a strategy (njt). If agents were risk 
neutral, Uijt would be a linear function of Wijt. However, since they have different risk attitudes, 
they calculate Uijt by different formulas, specified in Appendix A.  
3.1.2  Calculating Expected Utilities 
Since agents make choices before Uijt’s are observed, change is determined by their expectations, 
E[Uijt]’s.9 In the first period (t=1), strategies are randomly assigned, but for each t>1, agents 
choose the strategy, j*t, providing the highest expected utility: 
 (2). 
Since Wit-1 and S are invariant to strategy choice, the primary variable affecting expected utility 
is the income for each strategy, Iijt. Agents cannot perfectly anticipate Iijt because of exogenous 
uncertainty (δjt) and their inability to observe njt until the end of the period. Instead, they estimate 
a discrete probability distribution for each Iijt to use in the calculation of E[Uijt]’s.10 Specifically, 
for each strategy j and period t, agents calculate E[Uijt]’s by: 
a) calculating the probability of achieving income, by observing all prior incomes in 
strategy j that fall within discrete intervals s (s=1,…,12), and estimating the historical 
frequency (pjts) that income falls within discrete interval s (Note that since all agents have 
the same information, they form the same probabilities, pjts’s); 
                                                      
9  “Expectations” refer to the expected value of a random variable, defined in probability theory as the integral of the random 
variable with respect to its probability measure. 
10  The model is too complex to represent the cumulative distribution analytically. It is common to represent the cumulative 
discretely when analytical solutions are infeasible. The choice of twelve discrete intervals was the authors, and involves a 
tradeoff between precision and computation intensity. Each interval has an identical range, and the complete range over all 
intervals is the same for all strategies and determined by observing the range of all Iijt across all prior periods.   
€ 
Choose j *t , where E[Uij*t ]=max{E[Uij(1)t ];E[Uij(2)t ];E[Uij(3)t ];E[Uij(4 )t ];E[Uij(5)t ]}
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b) calculating utility under the midpoint incomes (Iijts) of each interval s, such that Uijts = 
Wijts = Wit-1 – S + Iijts, and based on formulas specified in Appendix A;  
c) multiplying pjts and Uijts for each s; and 
d) summing the twelve products derived in (c).  	    
The heuristic dictates that change occurs when E[Uij*t] > E[Uij*t-1], unless agents are 
constrained because Wit-1<S, where they choose strategy jt=j*t-1. It is entirely consistent with the 
principle of maximization underlying choice for subjectively rational agents, whose actual 
knowledge we specify. Satisficing behavior is not present. 
The simulation is run 200 times, each involving 100 agents over thirty periods, resulting 
in 600,000 observations.11 200 runs were estimated to eliminate the consequences of random 
assignments of initial parameters. Table 1 illustrates one agent’s decisions.  
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
3.2  Inferring “Aspirations” from the Sample of Maximizers 
Even though satisficing behavior is absent from the sample, historical and social aspirations can 
be derived using methods common to BT. To infer historical aspirations (A) for each agent, the 
model of Levinthal and March (1981) is used:  
     (3), 
where α is a weight coefficient, 0≤α≤1, dictating the emphasis placed on an agent’s prior 
performance, Pit-1, versus aspirations in the prior period, Ait-1. In the simulated model, Pit-1 is 
                                                      
11 All agents persist throughout the 30 periods because the benchmarks experiments of Lant (1992) and Lant and Montgomery 
(1987) do not allow for entry and exit of subjects.  
€ 
Ait =αPit−1 + (1−α)Ait−1
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equivalent to Iij*t-1, the prior income under the optimal strategy j*. Like in Greve (1998), the 
choice of α was determined by which value provided the best model fit, which was α=0.5.  
To infer social aspirations (B), Greve’s (1998) is used: 
       (4). 
Bmt represents the mean income of all km agents in social reference group m in period t-1, where 
m is dictated by risk attitude.12 Again, Pit-1 is the income derived in the prior period, Iij*t-1.  
The derivation of historical (A) and social (B) aspirations from the simulated data is 
helpful for several reasons. First, one can be completely confident that the derived aspirations are 
not behavioral because agents are predetermined to be rational. Second, since they were derived 
from methods common to BT implies that it is possible to infer aspirations in real data that are 
merely a manifestation of maximizing behavior. Indeed, this represents the concern about 
committing Type I error when falsely confirming BT. Third, it is now possible to test how potent 
this concern might be by using the data to replicate prior research confirming support for BT. If 
replications using aspirations derived from the simulation create similar results revealed in these 
foundational empirical analyses, then the concern about Type I error in these prior studies is 
accentuated, underscoring the imperative necessity of comparative testing.  
                                                      
12  Festinger (1954) developed the concept of social reference groups for individuals, not organizations. The behavioral literature 
has adapted the concept to organizations and uses different criteria for identifying social reference groups, such as firm size or the 
2-digit SIC code. In the simulated data, risk attitude represents the most pertinent basis for social comparisons.  
€ 
Bmt =
Pit−1
1
km
∑
km
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3.3  Fitting the Simulated Data to Foundational Models Purporting to Support Aspiration-
based Decision-Making 
Concerns about spurious support for BT emanate from (a) the correlation between expectations 
and aspirations, and (b) the potential for expectations, and not aspirations, to be the true causal 
factor. Historical aspirations (A) and social aspirations (B) are correlated (p<0.001) with 
expectations (E[Uij*t]) at 0.33 and 0.19, respectively.13 Correlations in real data might be equally 
high because both aspirations and expectations derive from past performance. However, these 
constructs are unique in that historical aspirations are based on an agent’s own history of 
performance, social aspirations are based on the immediate past performance of related others, 
and expectations are based on maximization over all historical performance of all firms across 
alternative strategies. Correlation does not imply causation. 
The first examination into whether expectations might be the true causal factor 
underlying studies confirming BT involves a replication of three studies that have investigated 
aspiration formation in real data. In contrast to the empirically derived aspirations of Levinthal 
and March (1981) and Greve (1998), Lant (1992), Lant and Montgomery (1987), and Mezias et 
al. (2002) all assume that aspirations are represented by sales targets (T) specified in 
questionnaires, and predict them in the following way: 
    (5), 
where Pit-1 is an agent’s performance in the prior period, (Pit-1–Tit-1) is an agent’s attainment 
discrepancy relative to historical aspirations, and (Pit-1–Bit-1) is attainment discrepancy relative to 
social aspirations. Lant (1992) and Lant and Montgomery (1987) assume β3=0, implying 
                                                      
13  A and B are correlated at 0.75, which is similar to the 0.65 correlation Greve (1998) reported for attainment discrepancies 
involving historical and social aspiration. Unreported analysis suggests that significant correlations between aspirations and 
expectations are robust across time periods and in Spearman and Kendall Tau rank tests.  
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aspirations are not determined by social comparison, but only historical aspirations. The three 
studies claim confirmation that sales targets represent aspirations because in each case Tit is 
positively affected by Tit-1 and negatively affected by attainment discrepancy. However, the 
confirmations are spurious if sales targets truly represent expectations. 
While it may never be known whether sales targets are expectations or aspirations, the 
true causality is known in the simulated data, enabling an assessment of whether expectations 
might be predicted in the same way as aspirations. The data are fit to the models used in those 
prior studies, except that Tit is replaced with E[Iij*t] and Pit-1 is represented by Iij*t-1.  
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
Table 2 illustrates the results alongside those of the three papers noted above.  Note that 
each replicated model produces coefficients that are significant and identical in direction. These 
results show complete convergence–the same factors that have influenced sales targets in prior 
studies influenced expected income in this study. This result has several implications. First, sales 
targets may represent expectations and not aspirations. While some may dismiss this logic 
because expectations may derive from aspirations, in the simulated data it is certain that 
expectations do not emanate from aspirations. Second, prior support for the effect of social 
comparison may be spurious, because an identical result is replicated when social aspirations do 
not exist in the data. Third, aspiration formation model tested in prior research may be too 
accommodating and unable to discriminate between expectations and aspirations.  
A much less safe BT model is replicated in the second examination of whether 
expectations might be the true causal factor underlying studies confirming BT. Greve’s (1998) 
study of organizational change offers a more specific prediction--that the negative relationship 
for attainment discrepancy is stronger when a firm performs above its aspiration than when it 
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performs below its aspiration.14 Such a prediction might have been lauded by Popper (1963: 36) 
who advocated that “confirmations should count only if they are the result of risky predictions” 
rather than “safe” ones. The fact that Greve (1998) found support for his hypotheses is 
compelling evidence in favor of BT. He did not, however, consider that expectations might be 
driving his result. His pooled logit model is replicated with the simulated data: 
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where Yit=1 if a strategy change occurred for agent i and Yit=0 otherwise; A and B represent 
historical and social aspirations, respectively; Pit-1 is again represented by Iij*t-1; Nit-1 is a negative 
inconsistency variable explicating the cases when performance falls between the two aspirations; 
and Xin represents the remaining vector of variables, which are ignored because of the controlled 
environment. Greve’s (1998) two main hypotheses predict that τ1,τ2,τ3, and τ4 should all be 
negative, and τ1<τ2 and τ3<τ4.   
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
Table 3 shows results alongside those of Greve (1998). Note that these results mirror Greve’s 
(1998), confirming the risky prediction noted immediately above. The main difference is that 
Greve (1998) estimated his model on real data in the radio broadcasting industry and cannot be 
sure of causality, while there is certainty that satisficing is not causing this result. Again, it seems 
that prior empirical support for BT may be subject to Type I error.  
3.4 Ascertaining how robust Type I errors appear in the simulated data 
To assure that the results are not endemic to the original specifications, a plethora of robustness 
tests were undertaken. The replications in Tables 2 and 3 demonstrated remarkable robustness: 
                                                      
14 See Appendix B for Greve’s hypotheses. 
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(a) after removing the budget constraint (Wijt<S), because some may argue that capital is readily 
available; (b) across ten deciles of switching costs (S); (c) across five different risk attitudes (m); 
(d) across ten deciles of uncertainty (λ); and (e) across all values of the weight coefficient (α) for 
aspiration formation. Replications were confirmed across many of these robustness checks. For 
example, the signs of coefficients were robust, as was the replication of Lant and Montgomery 
(1987) and Lant (1989). The replication of Mezias et al. (2002) was confirmed across all 
specifications for coefficients related to aspirations and attainment discrepancy, although the 
coefficient for social comparison was not supported in a few specifications. In almost every case, 
Greve’s (1998) hypotheses for a negative relationship for attainment discrepancy are confirmed. 
While failing to always simultaneously confirm his hypotheses 1B and 2B, either hypothesis 1B 
or 2B (see Table 9) are always confirmed. Finally, to consider whether the confirmations were 
due to the fact that five strategies were considered, the data were re-simulated with alternative 
numbers of strategies (i.e., 1-10, 30, 100), and tests continue to commit Type I error. These 
robustness checks demonstrate that, across a full array of model specifications, it is possible to 
diagnose aspirations when they are absent. These results should be clear evidence that 
comparative testing is needed to rule out alternative explanations and raise suspicion about prior 
support for BT. 
4.0   Recommendations for Comparative Testing  
This section offers recommendations for scholars interested in designing a study suitable for 
comparative testing between RC and BT. These recommendations focus on operationalizing the 
unique theoretical constructs and evaluating statistical tests capable of comparative testing. More 
generally, distinguishing between BT and RC is challenging because it is not desirable to reduce 
the risk of Type I error while excessively enhancing the risk of Type II error--where BT (or RC) 
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is falsely rejected when it is present. For this reason, it is necessary to examine the 
recommendations across different contexts–where the investigated causality (e.g., BT) is present, 
and where it is not. Specifically, three plausible scenarios in an empirical setting are investigated: 
true causality is pure maximizing behavior (as explained in section 3.1); true causality is pure 
satisficing behavior (explained in Appendix B); and true causality is a mixture of maximizing 
and satisficing behavior (explained in Appendix C, 60% of agents are satisficers and 40% are 
maximizers). This third scenario is invoked because it may be empirically plausible, and it 
enables a check for robustness in the most challenging empirical scenario–the context of mixed 
behavior. Table 4 clarifies the types of errors that might exist across these different contexts. 
Given that the true causality is known in each context, it is possible to test the effectiveness of 
the recommendations in simultaneously coping with Type I and II error. Since larger samples are 
the only way to simultaneously reduce the risks of both errors (Neter, Wasserman, and 
Whitmore, 1988), the effectiveness of our recommendations is examined on samples with nearly 
600,000 observations. In practice, however, large samples may not always be feasible, so we 
report how robust our recommendations are in smaller samples.  
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
Recommendations are presented in increasing order of technical sophistication. The 
recommendation researchers choose and adopt is best guided by their relative advantages and 
disadvantages, discussed below.     
4.1  Recommendation 1: Deliberate Controls  
The first recommendation follows directly from Stinchcombe (1968), who recommends the 
deliberate control of the value of possible spurious variables. Critical to this recommendation are 
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accurate operationalizations of maximizing/satisficing behavior and appropriate modeling 
techniques.  
4.1.1  Operationalizing Maximization 
Section 3 has already detailed Greve’s (1989) operationalization of satisficing behavior.  March 
and Heath (1994: 20) advocate accounting for maximizing behavior through “the relative 
position of alternatives.” This statement is interpreted to refer to the relative expected payoff to 
alternatives, which can be estimated in many cases. If alternatives can be enumerated, along with 
a reliable proxy for their expected payoffs, it is possible to identify whether firms are choosing 
strategies with the highest expected outcome (i.e., maximizing). For example, when studying 
whether attainment discrepancy affects the decision to acquire a target, as was done by Iyer and 
Miller (2008), expected payoffs for acquiring alternative targets can be estimated with indicators 
readily available in Compustat or CRSP, such as the price-to-earnings multiple, which 
DePamphlis (2003) suggested bidders actually use.15 When studying format changes in the radio 
broadcasting industry, Greve (1998) might have been able to estimate the “relative position of 
alternatives” through a comparison of expected sizes of target audiences for alternative formats. 
One way to the measure the relative value of alternatives is the Fechner Index (Fechner, 
1966), which is the standardized difference between the expected utilities of two alternatives:  
     (7), 
where η1 and η2 are noise parameters denoting errors made by agents in estimating E[U1] and 
E[U2], respectively.16 Equation 7 is modified in three ways. First, it is adapted to the context of 
organizational change, where one alternative is status quo (sq) and the other alternative is the 
                                                      
15  Alternative candidates for acquisition might be determined by identifying firms in the same market. 
16  In empirical setting, the denominator in equation 8 is to be estimated (see Harrison, 2008). 
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maximum of alternative strategies. Second, the denominator is eliminated because the simulated 
agents do not make mistakes. The denominator should be retained in contexts involving non-
simulated data. Third, since in real data utility is an unobservable function of wealth depending 
upon latent risk preferences, the index is simplified by assuming risk-neutral utility functions. 
Consequently, the modified index considers differences in expected wealth, where Wjt = Ijt+Wjt-1-
S.17 Note that while this simplification enhances empirical applicability, it sacrifices rigor in 
estimating utility maximization, which may make it more difficult to obtain support for RC. The 
modified index can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of remaining in the status quo, and the 
name is revised accordingly: 
    (8). 
Since maximizing agents change strategies whenever Opportunity Costjt > 0, opportunity cost 
should be operationalized as a dichotomous variable, such that Opportunity Cost Dummyjt = “1” 
if Opportunity Costjt > 0, and “0” otherwise. 
4.1.2  Modeling Organizational Change with Deliberate Controls 
Having derived a proxy for opportunity cost, we use Tables 5-7 to show how Opportunity Cost 
Dummy and Greve’s (1998) operationalization of aspirations impact the testing of the null 
hypothesis that a theory does not explain organizational change. Two models are used to 
estimate organizational change: pooled logit as in Greve (1998) and random effects logit to 
account for time and cross-sectional dependence. The implementation of a random effects model 
may be needed to appropriately account for path dependence emphasized in both theories, while 
pooled models assume temporal independence of observations. Failure to apply appropriate 
estimation techniques may result in misdiagnosing support for a theory.  
                                                      
17  After eliminating the denominator, the Fechner Index becomes E[U(Wj≠sq,t)]-E[U(Wj=sq,t)]. S is not in the second term because 
under the status quo alternative, switching cost is not relevant. 
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4.1.3  Evaluating the Effectiveness of Recommendation 1 
Table 5 illustrates models fitted to the data where the true causality is RC, and helps in 
assessing whether the recommendation is useful in ruling out a false positive (Type I error) for 
BT and a false negative (Type II error) for RC (cells A and B in Table 4). Column 1 replicates 
column 2 of Table 3, which was already demonstrated to be a Type I error. Column 2 of Table 5 
fits an alternative model aimed at diagnosing RC, using Opportunity Cost Dummy. As expected, 
Opportunity Cost Dummy is positive, suggesting agents are more likely to prefer change when 
the opportunity cost of the status quo is positive. Column 3 implements the first 
recommendation, by combining the BT variables with Opportunity Cost Dummy in a pooled logit 
model.18 This combined model yields a positive and significant Opportunity Cost Dummy, 
implying the recommendation rules out Type II error for RC. It also shows some ability to 
eliminate (Type I error) false confirmation of BT because robust support for BT is lost: social 
aspirations are rejected, while spurious support for historical aspirations persists. Replicating the 
comparative model in a random effects logit in column 5 significantly improves model fit and 
completely eradicates (Type I error) the spurious support for BT found in column 3, and avoids 
Type II error by revealing a positive coefficient for Opportunity Cost Dummy.  
(Insert Tables 5 ,6, and 7 about here) 
Table 6 illustrates models fitted to the data where the true causality is BT. This table 
helps assess whether the recommendation is useful in ruling out a false positive (Type I error) for 
RC and a false negative (Type II error) for BT (cells C and D in Table 4). Column 1 fits a 
behavioral model and demonstrates that agents change strategies based on aspirations as 
                                                      
18  The combined model is an improvement over models 1, as expected.  Interestingly, it is also an improvement over model 2, 
which is attributed to the fact that a relatively primitive model is used relying on the assumption that the coefficient is the same 
for all agents. Since there are five distinct risk attitudes present in the data, this should not be the case. 
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predicted by Greve (1998). This confirmation of BT creates confidence that Greve’s (1998) 
formalization of Cyert and March (1963) is implemented correctly in the simulation.19 Column 2 
fits an alternative model aimed at diagnosing RC, but the model is not significant. Column 3 
implements the first recommendation in a pooled model. This comparative model yields robust 
estimates for both social and historical aspirations, ruling out Type II error with respect to BT. It 
also rules out Type I error because Opportunity Cost Dummy is insignificant, it does not falsely 
confirm RC. These results hold up in a random effects logit model.  
The results reported in Tables 5 and 6 suggest that recommendation 1 is effective at 
eliminating Type I and II errors when the data generating processes are pure – all agents use 
either RC or BT. Table 7 illustrates models fitted to data where the true causality is a mixture of 
BT and RC. Since both heuristics are present, this scenario will help assess whether the 
recommendation is useful in ruling out false negatives (Type II error) for both RC and BT. 
Models of mixed data will not help in ruling out false positives (Type I errors) because they 
cannot occur if both behaviors are present. Opportunity Cost Dummy is insignificant across all 
models in the table, suggesting that we commit a Type II error, because we know RC is used by 
40 percent of the sample. BT is largely supported in our comparative tests (models 3 and 5), 
although it should be noted that support for social aspirations is lost in the random effects logit.  
These findings do not embolded great confidence that recommendation 1 is effective in 
discriminating between theories in the presence of mixed behavior. 
To assure that the recommendation was capable of discriminating between theories in 
smaller samples, we also tested the effectiveness of recommendation 1 across forty samples of 
14,000 observations, where agents were randomly drawn without replacement. Note that each of 
                                                      
19 Also, note that there is a close relationship between the estimated coefficients in column 1 of table 6 with the parameters in the 
simulation explained in Appendix B.  
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these subsamples included fewer observations than Greve’s (1989) sample. When the true 
causality is RC, Type I and Type II errors are avoided in all forty samples. When the true 
causality is BT, Type I error was avoided in all forty samples, and Type II error occurred in one 
of forty samples (we falsely confirmed RC 5 percent of the time). When the true causality is 
mixed, Type II error for BT was avoided in all 40 cases, but Type II error for RC occurred in 95 
percent of the cases. In short, these results on smaller samples show an identical pattern to the 
pattern of results reported in Tables 5-7.  
In summary, a key advantage of the first recommendation is the practicality in developing 
a proxy for opportunity cost and modeling it alongside BT. A disadvantage is the assumption of 
a simplified utility function, although we found no evidence of that this simplification placed the 
recommendation in jeopardy when data generating processes was pure. Another potential 
shortcoming is that combining RC and BT in a single model assumes their independence, and 
will lead to biased estimates if this assumption is false. Despite these concerns, this first 
recommendation prevented Type I and II errors across all pure scenarios, and was always 
effective at preventing Type II error for BT in mixed behavior when 60 percent of the agents 
were satisficers, but in that scenario was relatively inefficient in preventing Type II error for RC.  
4.2  Recommendation 2: Test of Non-Nested Alternative Hypotheses 
Recommendation 1 encourages ascribing variables from different theoretical models into a single 
empirical model. This is perhaps the most common approach to testing competing theories. It is 
equivalent to saying that the two theories are nested in a combined model, which implies that 
each of them “can be reduced to the other [combined] model” (Clarke, 2001: 727). To clarify, 
the following equations correspond to columns 1-3 in tables 5-7:  
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where Y is organizational change; X1 and X2 are vectors of variables; ω and ψ are coefficient 
vectors; and θ, ρ, and π are errors. The models 3 and 5, fit in Tables 5-7, rely on the assumption 
that X1 and X2 are not co-determined. If X1 and X2 are co-determined then estimates in the 
combined model (9c) will be biased. While one approach would be to estimate the combined 
model (9c) after controlling for endogeneity via instrumental variable probit, when there are no 
strong instruments for potentially endogenous parameters, this approach may reduce the 
reliability of estimation compared to models excluding instruments.20 Since there exist no strong 
instruments for aspirations and expectations a combined model may not be reliable. 
Recommendation 2 overcomes the problem noted above through a non-nested test, which helps 
in assessing the relative predictive power of model (9a) versus (9b). This test is particularly 
useful when there is a suspicion that one of the models (either 9a or 9b) provides a spurious 
correlation between dependent and independent variables.  
4.2.1  Evaluating the Effectiveness of Recommendation 2 
In our analysis we use Vuong’s (1989) test, which generates likelihood-ratio based statistics for 
testing the null hypothesis that the competing models are equally close to the true data generating 
process against the alternative hypothesis that one model is closer. Vuong’s test is noteworthy 
for its generality, allowing for theories to “be nested, non-nested, or overlapping, and that both, 
only one, or neither of the competing models may contain the true law generating the 
                                                      
20 Hahn and Hausman (2003: 118) discuss the implications of applying weak instruments: “…a researcher may estimate "bad 
results" and not be aware of the outcome.” While their work focused on linear models, Adkins (2009) finds that in probit models 
weak instruments enhance the bias. 
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observations” (p. 307).21 This test can be implemented with or without an adjustment in the 
likelihood ratio statistic for the number of parameters in the respective models. Since adjusted 
statistics penalize BT models more than RC models because they employ more variables, we use 
both adjusted and unadjusted statistics. Table 8 reveals the results of the non-nested test across 
our three scenarios. Under each scenario, the test effectively avoids Type I and Type II errors. 
(Insert Table 8  about here) 
To assure this recommendation is practical in smaller samples, we also tested the 
effectiveness of recommendation 2 on 40 samples of 14,000 observations. The non-nested test 
proved 100 percent effective at avoiding Type II error when the data generating processes were 
pure. In all cases of pure behavior, the adjusted and unadjusted likelihood-ratio statistics were 
significant. The non-nested test using the unadjusted likelihood-ratio test also proved 100 percent 
effective at avoiding Type II error in mixed behavior. However, we found the adjusted 
likelihood-ratio statistic to be 100 percent ineffective at determining BT was the dominant theory 
in the data. The fact that adjustment imposes a greater penalty in smaller samples suggests that a 
more conservative test should use the unadjusted statistic. 
In summary, a key advantage of this recommendation is that it avoids concerns about 
endogeneity when theoretical constructs may be co-determined. It is easy to implement and 
reliably predicts the dominant causality in the data. Like recommendation 1, it relies on a 
simplified utility function. Note that passing such test does not mean that the theory in question 
is true, it simply means that the theory is better than the available alternative. Finally, this 
                                                      
21  Other notable non-nested tests are offered by Akaike (1973) and Cox (1961). Compared to the Akaike test, the Vuong test 
does not require that a “best” model be chosen if the competing models are statistically equivalent.  Compared to the Cox test, the 
Vuong test allows for competing models to be either strictly non-nested or overlapping. In the presence of mixed behavior, 
allowing for both of these is important. 
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recommendation effectively identifies the theory most robustly present in the data, and therefore 
more credible, but it does not imply that the losing theory is absent in the data.   
4.3  Recommendation 3: Comparative Robustness of Alternative Theories 
The third recommendation is similar to recommendation 2 in its aversion to a combined model 
(e.g., equation 9c). It is similar to recommendation 1 in testing the null hypothesis that a theory 
does not explain organizational change. The emphasis is on the relative robustness of each 
separate model (e.g., equations 9a and 9b). Here, a sort of competition, or test of comparative 
robustness, is encouraged for how persistent confirmations are to empirical assumptions used to 
instrument the theory. While it is well-known that models robust to alterations in empirical 
assumptions are less likely to generate Type I error, we advocate that the winner of the 
competition is the theory that is more robust to alterations in assumptions, implying it is more 
likely to represent the true causality.22 Of course, a number of types of robustness tests may be 
reasonable candidates. Below, two specific tests are recommended for a competition between RC 
and BT. Each test is described separately, and the results of the competition are summarized. 
4.3.1  Robustness Test of RC model 
In recommendations 1 and 2, the assumption was made that all firms have the same utility 
function. Empirically, utility was estimated through a single coefficient for the Opportunity Cost 
Dummy. While this assumption is pragmatic because utilities are latent, firms may have different 
utility functions, and correspondingly, may be differentially sensitive to wealth. If the 
                                                      
22 The idea that robustness reduces concerns about Type I error is noted by Wimsatt (1981: 140): “If a result is robust over a 
range of parameter values in a given model or over a variety of models making different assumptions, this gives us some 
independence of knowledge of the exact structure and parameter values of the system under study: a prediction of this result will 
remain true under a variety of such conditions and parameter values. This is particularly important in scientific areas where it 
may be difficult to determine the parameter values and conditions exactly.” 
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assumption of homogeneity of utilities across firms is relaxed, it is possible to test the robustness 
of the initial findings (recommendations 1 and 2) when accounting for heterogeneous utilities.  
Very recent developments in econometrics of choice identify latent utility classes using 
non-parametric techniques. A non-parametric mixed logit developed by Train (2008) is estimated 
under the assumption that an agent’s utility for a particular strategy is a function of wealth under 
the strategy, as indicated below: 
     (10), 
where λ is a coefficient, and υ represents error.23 Note that because coefficient λ is specific to 
each agent i, the model allows heterogeneous utility, and therefore, generates superior fit relative 
to models assuming homogeneity. Because the model is designed to achieve superior fit, the 
most reliable indicator of the type of behavior dominating the sample is , the population mean 
coefficient (Train, 2008).  is the sum of the products of each class’s coefficient and proportion 
in the population. Accordingly, to ascertain whether RC is robustly present in the data, the sign 
and significance of  is analyzed. The test involves three steps: (1) deriving the number of latent 
classes affecting utility; (2) estimating the model given the number of latent classes; and (3) 
bootstrapping  to ascertain significance. 
 The test generated the following results across the three scenarios.  When the true 
causality is RC, =1997.9 and significantly greater than zero (p=0.001). That  is positive 
suggests that RC is robustly present because, on average, agents prefer choices that give them 
more wealth. When the true causality is BT,  = -0.9 and significantly less than zero (p=0.001). 
That  is negative suggests that RC is not robustly present because wealth is not a positive 
predictor of choice, on average. When the true causality is mixed, =12.9 and significantly 
                                                      
23 The term Wijt is used in this estimation because it is unique to each alternative j, whereas Opportunity Costit is a property of a 
pair of alternatives. 
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greater than zero (p < 0.001), suggesting that RC is robustly present. Thus, in contrast to the 
prior recommendations, recommendation 3 identifies RC in mixed behavior when rational 
behavior is in the minority. This same pattern of results was obtained on a random sample of 
14,000 observations across each of the three scenarios, suggesting that the Train model is 
suitable for discriminating the presence of RC in smaller samples, a finding already established 
by Train (2008), who used a sample of 508.24   
4.3.2  Robustness Test of BT Model 
In recommendations 1 and 2, when testing for BT with Attainment Discrepancy for historical 
aspirations, the assumption was made that estimation of the model should involve the unique 
value of the weight coefficient, α, providing the best fit. This assumption is consistent with 
current approaches in the literature but is problematic in two respects. First, it does not 
simultaneously estimate α with other parameters in the model. Simultaneous estimation is 
appropriate if α is endogenous to aspirations, which is stated to be the case within BT (see 
equation 3). Second, it does not provide test statistics about whether α contributes meaningfully 
to the prediction, which makes it impossible to ascertain whether α is statistically different from 
zero or any other values of α. This motivates consideration of how sensitive the support for BT 
is to the choice of α. If the true causality in the population is BT, it is expected that the diagnosis 
of BT will be robust across more specifications of α. Whereas, if the true causality is RC, or a 
mixture of RC and BT, it is expected that less robustness would obtain across values of α.25  
                                                      
24 We did not replicate this test across forty randomly generated subsamples in three scenarios because based on Train’s (2008) 
insight, we calculate the computational time to be two years on a single-core machine. 
25 So, like Baum, et al. (2005), tests are encouraged for robustness of findings to the choice of α, but suggest this is only one of 
two components in the competition for comparative robustness between RC and BT. An unbiased comparative test would 
simultaneously compare the robustness of α, and robustness of maximization described in the preceding section. 
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The model reported in column 1 of Tables 5-7 was fit for different values of α. Table 9 
reports the number of times BT was confirmed across all three scenarios. When the true causality 
is RC, it was impossible to simultaneously confirm both types of aspirations. When the true 
causality is BT, it was possible to simultaneously confirm both types of aspirations for 12 out of 
14 values of α. When the behavior is mixed, simultaneous confirmation of both types of 
aspirations obtained for 11 out of 14 values of α. The analysis illustrates that the 
recommendation is effective in diagnosing robust support for BT when it is present, while 
avoiding robust support for RC when it is not present. An inference for researchers is that the 
more robust findings are to variations in α, the more reliable are confirmations of BT. 
(Insert Table 9  about here) 
 To demonstrate that this robustness check is feasible on smaller samples, we replicated 
the tests in forty random subsamples of smaller size (n=14,000), constituting 560 attempts for 
each scenario (14α x 40) . When the true causality was RC, we never simultaneously confirmed 
both types of aspirations. When the true causality was BT, we simultaneously confirmed both 
types of aspirations 75.1 percent of the time. In mixed behavior, we simultaneously confirmed 
both types of aspirations 64.1 percent of the time. Note that historical aspirations were confirmed 
100 percent of the time in pure BT and mixed scenarios. These results suggest that this 
robustness check can be reliably performed in samples of 14,000. 
4.3.3  Evaluating the Effectiveness of Recommendation 3 
The comparative robustness of confirmations to RC and BT can be examined across the three 
scenarios, which should point researchers unambiguously toward the true causality. When the 
true causality is RC, the two tests outlined above demonstrate robust confirmation of RC and a 
lack of robustness for BT. When the true causality is BT, the tests demonstrate non-robustness of 
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RC and robust support for BT. When the true causality is a mixture of RC and BT, the tests 
demonstrate confirmation of RC and relatively strong robustness of BT. In each scenario these 
comparative tests help to successfully diagnose the true causality present in the data.  
Finally, this third recommendation effectively diagnoses true causality. Relative to the 
other two recommendations, it is more rigorous in estimating utility, less reliant on specific 
operationalizations of theory, and avoids concerns about endogeneity. A limitation is that it does 
not involve a statistical test for comparative robustness. 
5.  Conclusion 
It has been nearly fifty years since Cyert and March (1963) considered that organizational 
change may be guided not by rational behavior, but by boundedly rational behavior. While their 
thesis is decidedly comparative in nature, the empirical research seeking to confirm aspiration-
level decision-making has not been as comparative, which raises concerns about erroneous 
confirmations. While comparative tests between behavioral theory and rational choice have not 
been implemented in prior research, we use simulated data to demonstrate that it is possible to do 
so effectively, and offer a template for how they might be conducted with real (non-simulated) 
data. Analysis of simulated data shows that rational decision-makers behave in a statistically 
similar manner as predicted in several seminal projects claiming support for behavioral theory. 
The simulated agents appear to be satisficing, when they are clearly not. Results are remarkably 
robust, and imply that until future work implements comparative testing, support that 
organizations change based on aspiration is tenuous. Three recommendations for comparatively 
testing behavioral theory and rational choice are shown to be remarkably effective at controlling 
Type I and Type II error in simulated data. If implemented together, they overcome the bounds 
of any singular test. 
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The recommendations for comparative testing are designed to improve empirical 
discrimination between behavioral theory and rational choice, but the very process of 
implementing them will amplify and clarify the scope of behavioral theory. Comparative testing 
may lead to three potential outcomes. First, it may confirm behavioral theory as the dominant 
explanation in real data, which will serve to accentuate the credibility of the theory and empirical 
approximations of the theory. Second, it may disconfirm behavioral theory as the dominant 
explanation in real data. This finding is a signal for researchers to look for theoretical and 
empirical causes of disconfirmation, which may result from applying the theory beyond the 
original boundary conditions of the theory. For example, since Cyert and March (1963) 
developed their theory for large, multi-product firms, where information efficiencies and 
political processes are at play, it may be inappropriate to map the theory unaltered onto 
entrepreneurial firms. Disconfirmation may also lead scholars to reconsider the original 
boundary conditions established by Cyert and March (1963). Finally, disconfirmation may help 
deduce imprecise operationalization of theoretical concepts and the relationships they imply, or 
inspire research designs better enabling scholars to distinguish aspirations from expectations. 
A third possible outcome from implementing the recommendations could simultaneously 
confirm some in the population satisfice while others maximize. While the non-nested test 
developed by Vuong (1989) explicitly allows for theoretical overlap in samples, it only allows 
one to discern whether one theory better explains the data, and not the extent to which each 
explains the data. Finite mixture models have been recently developed to tackle this issue. They 
“estimate the parameters of each theory while simultaneously estimating the probability that each 
theory applies to the sample” (Harrison and Rutström, 2009: 133). A challenge with mixture 
models of this kind is that convergence may not occur in maximum likelihood estimations 
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(Harrison and Rutström, 2009: 137), as was the case with the data simulated for this paper. 
Nevertheless, such problems are being actively addressed in econometrics of choice, suggesting 
an interesting opportunity is eminent. Transparent attempts at comparative testing in mixed data 
will strengthen the support of behavioral theory.   
Some may criticize this study’s replication of prior empirical work as mere manipulation 
of data and initial conditions. This critique is impotent for several reasons. First, the replications 
are robust across a wide range of specifications. While these replications are not “globally” 
robust because the considered range does not reflect the universe of potential specifications, they 
are “locally” robust. It is infeasible to show global robustness because the potential set of initial 
parameters is unbounded. Moreover, doing so would suggest that behavioral theory reduces to 
rational choice, which is certainly not the intent of this paper. Moreover, the fact that 
recommendations effectively discriminate between behavioral theory and rational choice should 
exhibit evidence that the replications are not a product of initial specifications.  
Others may criticize as unrealistic the characterization of pure satisficing or maximizing 
behavior, instead preferring some hybrid representation. As demonstrated, however, these pure 
scenarios are necessary for distinguishing between Type I and Type II error. Some may prefer 
comparatively testing behavioral theory against a rational choice that is instrumented with 
Simon’s objective rationality, incorporating game-theoretic reasoning. Since agents would not 
rely as heavily on prior performance as they do in our model of subjective rationality, such an 
approach may make it more difficult to replicate empirical confirmations of behavioral theory, 
which may be important to those fastening affections to behavioral theory. Comparative tests 
between the theories should focus on the maximizing and satisficing heuristics, not on 
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assumptions about knowledge that are merely used to instrument both theories. Indeed, it is 
advisable to adopt the most general interpretation of a theory, not a more strict interpretation.  
The striking similarity observed between aspirations and expectations should not be 
interpreted as a condemnation of behavioral theory or satisficing behavior. Clearly, 
organizational aspirations are important. Rather, this study is a call for greater insight into when 
aspirations are important and when they are not. One could take issue with the targeted attack on 
empirical work around aspirations, claiming that empirical work around rational choice suffers 
equal limitations. Clearly the principles of comparative testing apply equally to both theories. 
The readers of this journal, however, tend to be predominantly organizational. Moreover, the 
recommendations do not favor either behavioral theory or rational choice. The use of three 
scenarios demonstrates agnosticism about true causality. 
One limitation is that behavioral theory and rational choice are analyzed as the only 
alternatives predicting change. Other explanations are plausible, and in the presence of a third 
unobserved theory, comparatively testing two theories is not sufficient for diagnosing causality. 
Recall the purpose was not to comparatively test in real data, but demonstrate the consequences 
of failing to do so and offer reliable solutions for comparative testing. This purpose is most 
effectively accomplished by focusing on a single theory and its most likely alternative. 
The explicit focus on behavioral theory must not blind scholars who are studying 
organizational change and who have other affections. Affections can endanger research by 
straining the integrity of the intellectual process. Comparative testing is needed to discipline all 
inquiry of organizational phenomena. Of course, the rigor with which one implements 
comparative testing is the ultimate discipline. 
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Appendix A: Utility Functions Assumed in Section 3.1 
 
Risk attitude (m) Utility Function (U) Type of risk attitude 
1 U(W) = e0.60W-1 risk-seeking 
2 U(W) = e0.50W-1 risk-seeking 
3 U(W) = -e-1.00W+1 risk-averse 
4 U(W) = -e-1.05W+1 risk-averse 
5 U(W) = -e-1.10W +1 risk-averse 
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Appendix B: Description of the Simulation of Change Under Satisficing Behavior 
Like in Greve (2002), change is simulated through satisficing behavior, but this simulation is 
altered to make the behavior entirely consistent with the benchmark model of Greve (1998), who 
specifies a decision heuristic in hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b, listed below.26 
Hypothesis la (2a): When performance relative to the social (historical) aspiration level 
increases, the probability of change decreases.  
Hypothesis lb (2b): The decrease in the probability of change is greater for performance 
increases above the social (historical) aspiration level. 
 
In accord with BT, change behavior is simulated in the following way: 
1. Historical aspirations in the first period (Ai1) are randomly drawn from U (0, 0.25). 
2. Groups are determined to be reference groups for social aspirations. 
3. Beginning period 2, agents calculate attainment discrepancies for historical (Iit-1-Ait-1) and 
social aspirations (Iit-1-Bit-1).  
4. In the first period, choice of strategy is random to generate the first record of 
performance. 
5. In subsequent periods, probability of change qit for each agent is determined the 
following logistic function: 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]0 1 1 1 2 1 1 3 1 1 4 1 1 5 10 0 0 0log1
it
it it it it it it it it it
it
q I A I A I B I B N
q
ω ω ω ω ω ω− − − − − − − − −> < > <= + − + − + − + − +−
 
where coefficients ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4 are arbitrarily assigned values -10, -5, -8, -4, 
respectively, consistent with Greve’s (1998) prediction that the probability of change is 
more negative when performance is above aspirations than below; coefficient ω5 is 
arbitrarily assigned a value of 20, consistent with Greve’s (1998) expectation that it 
should be positive; and intercept ω0 is assigned a negative value, as found in Greve’s 
(1998) model.  
6.  is then used to predict change (Yit), a value of zero or one, through the Bernoulli 
distribution. 
7. If Yit=1, agents randomly move to one of the four remaining strategies (Greve, 2002). 
 
All parameters not mentioned above are unchanged from section 3.1. 200 runs result in 600,000 
observations. Note that the simulation is entirely consistent with Cyert and March (1963). 
                                                      
26  Greve (1998) uses the negative inconsistency parameter to resolve the ambiguity when performance lies between social and 
historical aspirations, while Greve (2002) resolves the ambiguity by assigning importance weights to historical and social 
aspirations.  
€ 
Ù qit
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Appendix C: Description of the Simulation of Change Under Mixed Behavior 
Change is simulated through a mixture of satisficing and maximizing behaviors. There are 
infinite ways to mix behavior. For this sample, mixture is established in the following way: 
1. Agents are randomly assigned to five groups.  
2. Agents in groups 3-5 behave in accord with Appendix B. 
3. Agents in group 1 have the same utility function as specified for risk attitude m=3, and 
behave in accord with section 3.1.  
4. Agents in group 2 have the same utility function as specified for risk attitude m=5, and 
behave in accord with section 3.1. 
 
All parameters not mentioned above remain unchanged from section 3.1. 200 runs result in 
600,000 observations, approximately 60 percent of which represent satisficing behavior and 40 
percent represent maximizing behavior. Note that the simulation is entirely consistent with both 
BT and RC for separate parts of the sample. Recognize the simulation does not just merge data 
sets generated separately by maximizers and satisficers. They act simultaneously in the same 
setting, resulting in interactions between agents with different heuristics. One subtlety of this 
mixed behavior is that because agents in groups 3-5 randomly choose strategies if dissatisfied, 
the landscape is more effectively revealed to maximizing agents, who otherwise would not have 
recognized superior alternative that were unexplored.  
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Table 1. Representation of a History for a Single Agent from a Run for All 30 periods27 
Period 
(t) 
Wealth at the 
beginning of 
the period 
(Wit-1) 
Past 
strategy 
(jt-1*) 
Costs of 
switching 
(S) 
Expected utility (E[Uijt]) Chosen 
strategy 
(jt*) j=1 j=2 j=3 j=4 j=5 
1 0.0000000 - 0.0022996 - - - - - 4 
2 0.1282474 4 0.0022996 0.20705
01 
0.31545
11 
0.14657
29 
0.20896
24 
0.26324
16 
2 
3 0.1170309 2 0.0022996 0.19765
6 
0.16454
84 
0.13646
24 
0.19765
6 
0.25451
32 
5 
4 0.1170295 5 0.0022996 0.19765
49 
0.19268
72 
0.13646
12 
0.19765
49 
0.16580
45 
1 
5 0.2243357 1 0.0022996 0.28487
83 
0.29133
68 
0.22847
64 
0.28314
95 
0.25289
12 
2 
6 0.2775171 2 0.0022996 0.35263
02 
0.31332
01 
0.27037
78 
0.32208
17 
0.29346
66 
1 
7 0.2398448 1 0.0022996 0.25693
1 
0.28388
65 
0.24093
85 
0.29472
85 
0.2 495
89 
4 
8 0.2760066 4 0.0022996 0.28288
7 
0.31056
75 
0.26921
97 
0.2 029
8 
0.29234
52 
2 
9 0.3917541 2 0.0022996 0.36495
33 
0.39309
66 
0.35285
01 
0.36111
98 
0.36106
78 
2 
10 0.3842933 2 0.0022996 0.34810
12 
0.38092
88 
0.34776
05 
0.35609
53 
0.35604
28 
2 
11 0.4086289 2 0.0022996 0.36454
78 
0.39163
74 
0.36421
56 
0.37234
01 
0.36384
12 
2 
12 0.4169403 2 0.0022996 0.3 006
92 
0.39339
46 
0.36973
99 
0.39018
32 
0.36936
88 
2 
13 0.3978081 2 0.0022996 0.35728
67 
0.37244
14 
0.35695
08 
0.38698
84 
0.35657
2 
4 
14 0.4792343 4 0.0022996 0.40995
36 
0.42247
36 
0.4 964
51 
0.44388
61 
0.40929
74 
4 
15 0.5640773 4 0.0022996 0.46024
46 
0.47169
75 
0.4 996
25 
0.49350
15 
0.45964
44 
4 
16 0.5901301 4 0.0022996 0.47480
97 
0.48 95
36 
0.47453
52 
0.50046
69 
0.47 22
57 
4 
17 0.6458557 4 0.0022996 0.50465
79 
0.51516
84 
0.50439
89 
0.52476
13 
0.50410
71 
4 
18 0.7339408 4 0.0022996 0.54841
69 
0.55799
89 
0.54818
08 
0.56891 0.54791
47 
4 
19 0.7625536 4 0.0022996 0.5 178
22 
0.57108
07 
0.56155
32 
0.57918
73 
0.56129
49 
4 
20 0.8038235 4 0.0022996 0.58036
61 
0.58927
02 
0.58014
68 
0.59520
43 
0.57 89
95 
4 
21 0.8913667 4 0.0022996 0.61721
93 
0.62534
14 
0.61701
92 
0.63222
77 
0.61679
36 
4 
22 0.8777467 4 0.0022996 0.61170
58 
0.62097
01 
0.61150
29 
0.62295
61 
0.61127
41 
4 
23 0.9148593 4 0.0022996 0.62654
6 
0.63881
19 
0.6 635
08 
0.63660
99 
0.62613
06 
2 
24 0.8934351 2 0.0022996 0.61804
97 
0.62595
06 
0.61785
01 
0.62744
41 
0.61762
5 
4 
25 0.903338 4 0.0022996 0.62200
07 
0.62856
66 
0.62 80
31 
0.63 71
74 
0.62158
04 
4 
26 0.9760581 4 0.0022996 0.64978
89 
0.65889
34 
0.64960
58 
0.65956
74 
0.64939
94 
4 
27 1.004296 4 0.0022996 0.66002
01 
0.67057
22 
0.6 984
23 
0.66911
37 
0.65964
2 
2 
28 1.017782 2 0.0022996 0.66480
03 
0.67490
51 
0.66462
52 
0.67297
75 
0.66442
76 
2 
29 1.116383 2 0.0022996 0.69776
79 
0.70807
28 
0.69760
99 
0.70 14
08 
0.69743
18 
2 
30 1.111112 2 0.0022996 0.69609
06 
0.70561
99 
0.6 593
18 
0.7 350
44 
0.69575
27 
2 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
27 A sample agent with m=4. 
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Table 2.  Estimating the Determinants of Aspirations:  A Comparison of Lant and Montgomery 
(1987), Lant (1992), and Mezias et al. (2002) with Replications on the Data Where True Causality is 
RC28 
  
Hypothesized 
Relationships 
in the 
Benchmark 
Studies 
 
Lant and 
Montgomery 
(1987) & Lant 
(1992)29 
Replication of 
(1) on 
simulated data 
where true 
causality is 
RC30 
Mezias et. al 
(2002)31 
Replication of 
(3) on 
simulated data 
where true 
causality is 
RC 
	    1 2 3 4 
Constant  + * + *** - + *** 
Historical Aspiration ( Ait-1)  + + ** + *** + *** + *** 
Attainment Discrepancy for  
Historical Aspiration (Iit-1-Ait-1)  
+ + ** + *** + *** + *** 
Attainment Discrepancy for 
Social Aspiration (Iit-1-Bit-1) 
-    - ** - *** 
Adjusted R2  0.839 0.888 	   	  
R2  	   	   0.976 0.512 
F-statistic  271.72** 2,141,315*** 	   	  
Hausman test for random 
effects  	   	   n.a. 8554.740*** 
F-test for addition of 
attainment discrepancy social  	   	   * *** 
Number of observations  105 540,000 860 135,000 
 
* p < 0.05; 
** p<0.01; 
***p <0.001  
 
 
 
 
                                                      
28 Only the direction of the relationships is indicated in the table, since the referred studies do not standardize coefficients. 
 
29 From Table 2 of Lant and Montgomery (1987) and Table 2 of Lant (1992). Lant (1992) estimated the generalized linear models 
with  the Corchrane and Orcutt (1949) transformation. Because the signs of corresponding coefficients are the same across 
industries considered in her study, we report results only for Industry 1. 
30 Because the Corchrane and Orcutt (1949) transformation dictates omission of the first observation in each series and social 
aspirations can only be derived starting with t=2, only observations starting with t=3 were used, resulting in 540,000 observations 
in this model.  
31 From Table 3 of Mezias et al. (2002). They estimated the Fuller and Battese (1974) variance component models with two 
alternative proxies for Attainment Discrepancy for Social Aspiration, which they name Social Comparison. Due to the fact that 
the signs of the coefficients are the same, we report results only for their Model 4. Unfortunately, SAS does not estimate the 
TSCSREG procedure when sample sizes are large, which is the case with the simulated data. Therefore, sample histories of 
randomly selected 5,000 agents in periods 2-30 were used for analysis. 
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Table 3.  Estimating Organizational Change:  A Comparison of Greve (1998) with Replication on 
the Data Where True Causality is RC  
  
Hypothesized 
Relationships 
in the benchmark 
study32  
Model 
Greve (1998) 
Pooled logit 
Replication of (1) 
on simulated data 
where true 
causality is RC 33 
1 2 
Constant  -2.085 -1.049* 
Positive Attainment Discrepancy for Historical 
Aspiration (Iit-1-Ait-1)>0 
_ _ -0.168* -11.211* 
Negative Attainment Discrepancy for 
Historical Aspiration (Iit-1-Ait-1)<0 
_ -0.054* -9.971* 
Positive Attainment Discrepancy for Social 
Aspiration (Iit-1-Bit-1)>0 
_ _ -0.187* -0.968* 
Negative Attainment Discrepancy for Social 
Aspiration (Iit-1-Bit-1)<0 
_ -0.048* -0.785* 
Negative inconsistency, (Nit-1)  0.020 20.595* 
Log Likelihood  -5,832.65* -316,981.24* 
Number of observations  16,294 560,000 
 	  
*p <0.001 
	  
 
	   	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
32 Model 5 in Greve (1998, Table 2) is used as a benchmark for comparison.      
33 560,000 observations are used for analysis because strategies were assigned in period 1 and the derivation of social aspirations 
(described in section 3.2) is allowable after period 2. 
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Table 4.  Type I and Type II Errors When Scenarios are Pure Maximizing, Pure   
Satisficing, or Mixed Behavior 
	   True Causality 
	   Maximizing Satisficing Mixed 
Type I error 
(false positive) 
A C  
Confirm BT when it 
is not true 
Confirm RC when it 
is not true  
Type II error 
(false negative) 
B D E 
Reject RC when it is 
true  
Reject BT when it is 
true  
Reject BT and/or RC 
when they are true 
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Table 5. Estimation of the Data Where True Causality is RC 
  
Model 
Pooled logit Random-effects logit 
1 2 3 4 5 
Constant -1.049** -1.018** -1.029** -1.263** -1.264** 
Opportunity Cost   19.447** 19.837**   25.014** 
Positive Attainment Discrepancy for 
Historical Aspiration (Iit-1-Ait-1)>0 
-11.211**   -15.555** -10.244** -16.087** 
Negative Attainment Discrepancy for 
Historical Aspiration (Iit-1-Ait-1)<0 
-9.971**   -12.553** -13.756** -17.499** 
Positive Attainment Discrepancy for 
Social Aspiration (Iit-1-Bit-1)>0 
-0.968**   1.090** 0.529* 3.113** 
Negative Attainment Discrepancy for 
Social Aspiration (Iit-1-Bit-1)<0 
-0.785**   3.482** -1.041** 4.498** 
Negative inconsistency, (Nit-1) 20.595**   12.078** 28.225** 18.056** 
Log Likelihood -316,981** -305,593** -291,920** -308,671** -278,882** 
Likelihood-ratio test vs. model 1, χ
2     27,346.90**   	  
Likelihood-ratio test vs. model 2, χ
2
     50,123.24**     
Likelihood-ratio test vs. model 4, χ
2
 	   	   	   	   59,578.84** 
Likelihood-ratio test vs. respective 
pooled model, χ
2
 
      17,000** 26,000** 
Number of observations 560,000 560,000 560,000 560,000 560,000 
Effectiveness in Eliminating Type I Error 
(false positive) for RC    n.a.  n.a. 
Effectiveness in Eliminating Type I Error 
(false positive) for BT   
partially 
effective  
completely 
effective 
Effectiveness in Eliminating Type II Error 
(false negative) for RC   
completely 
effective  
completely 
effective 
Effectiveness in Eliminating Type II Error 
(false negative) for BT   n.a.  n.a. 
 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.001 
n.a. = not applicable 
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Table 6. Estimation of the Data Where True Causality is BT 
  
Model 
Pooled logit Random-effects logit 
1 2 3 4 5 
Constant -0.934* -0.678* -0.942* -0.934* -0.942* 
Dummy Opportunity Cost  -0.007 0.011  0.011 
Positive Attainment Discrepancy for 
Historical Aspiration (Iit-1-Ait-1)>0 
-8.982*  -8.982* -8.985* -8.986* 
Negative Attainment Discrepancy for 
Historical Aspiration (Iit-1-Ait-1)<0 
-4.900*  -4.900* -4.902* -4.901* 
Positive Attainment Discrepancy for 
Social Aspiration (Iit-1-Bit-1)>0 
-5.849*  -5.848* -5.849* -5.849* 
Negative Attainment Discrepancy for 
Social Aspiration (Iit-1-Bit-1)<0 
-4.111*  -4.111* -4.112* -4.112* 
Negative inconsistency, (Nit-1) 16.482*  16.482*   16.487* 
Log Likelihood -253,292* -358,151 -253,291* -253,291* -253,290* 
Likelihood-ratio test vs. model 1, χ
2 	    1.85  	  
Likelihood-ratio test vs. model 4, χ
2
 	   	   	   	   1.85 
Likelihood-ratio test vs. respective pooled 
model, χ
2
 
	   	    0.52 0.55 
Number of observations 560,000 560,000 560,000 560,000 560,000 
Effectiveness in Eliminating Type I Error (false 
positive) for RC    
completely 
effective  
completely 
effective 
Effectiveness in Eliminating Type I Error (false 
positive) for BT   n.a.  n.a. 
Effectiveness in Eliminating Type II Error (false 
negative) for RC   n.a.  n.a. 
Effectiveness in Eliminating Type II Error (false 
negative) for BT   
completely 
effective  
completely 
effective 
 
*p < 0.001;  
n.a. = not applicable 
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Table 7. Estimation of the Data Where True Causality is Mixed Behavior 
  
Model 
Pooled logit Random-effects logit 
1 2 3 4 5 
Constant -0.107* -0.117* -0.100* -0.439* -0.432* 
Dummy Opportunity Cost  -0.000 -0.010  -0.009 
Positive Attainment Discrepancy for 
Historical Aspiration (Iit-1-Ait-1)>0 
-7.059*  -7.059* -6.554* -6.554* 
Negative Attainment Discrepancy for 
Historical Aspiration (Iit-1-Ait-1)<0 
-3.026*  -3.025* -4.909* -4.909* 
Positive Attainment Discrepancy for 
Social Aspiration (Iit-1-Bit-1)>0 
-3.165*  -3.165* -2.419* -2.419* 
Negative Attainment Discrepancy for 
Social Aspiration (Iit-1-Bit-1)<0 
-2.462*  -2.462* -3.664* -3.664* 
Negative inconsistency, (Nit-1) 9.560*  9.561* 12.079* 12.080* 
Log Likelihood -307,280* -387,195 -307,279* -288,489* -288,489* 
Likelihood-ratio test vs. model 1, χ
2 	    1.62  	  
Likelihood-ratio test vs. model 6, χ
2
 	   	   	   	   1.21 
Likelihood-ratio test vs. respective pooled 
model, χ
2
 
	   	    38,000* 38,000* 
Number of observations 560,000 560,000 560,000 560,000 560,000 
Effectiveness in Eliminating Type I Error (false 
positive) for RC    n.a.  n.a. 
Effectiveness in Eliminating Type I Error (false 
positive) for BT   n.a.  n.a. 
Effectiveness in Eliminating Type II Error (false 
negative) for RC   ineffective  ineffective 
Effectiveness in Eliminating Type II Error (false 
negative) for BT   
completely 
effective  
partially 
effective 
 
* p < 0.001;  
n.a. = not applicable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Non-nested Test of Alternative Hypotheses34  
True 
Causality Null Hypothesis 
Vuong's (1989) Test  Effectiveness in Eliminating 
z-statistic z-statistic corrected35 
Type I Error 
for RC 
Type I Error 
for BT 
Type II 
Error for RC 
Type II 
Error for BT 
RC 
 RC is not better than BT 34.249* 101.856* n.a. n.a. completely effective 
n.a. 
 BT is not better than RC  -34.249 -101.856 n.a. completely effective 
n.a. n.a. 
BT 
 BT is not better than RC36 296.371* 240.383* n.a. n.a. n.a. completely effective 
 RC is not better than BT36 -296.371 -240.383 completely effective 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Mixed 
 BT is not better than RC 36 249.542* 187.685* n.a. n.a. n.a. completely effective 
 RC is not better than BT36 - 249.542 -187.685 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  
 
*p < 0.001;  
n.a. = not applicable 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
34 Because the true causality is not known ex ante in an empirical setting, two null hypotheses were tested for each of the three scenarios. The two tests performed on the same data 
generate statistics of the same absolute value but opposite signs and have p-values, summing to one. While testing both null hypotheses is redundant in the case of known causality, 
this step is exercised in the paper to illustrate its empirical implementation. Based on the p-values, one of the following 3 outcomes may potentially obtain: (1) neither of the 
theories is diagnosed to be better than another; (2) BT is diagnosed to be better than RC; or (3) RC is diagnosed to be better than BT.       
35 The Schwartz (1978) correction is used. 
36 The non-nested test in these instances is not required, because, in each of those cases, one of the compared models is insignificant (Models 2 in Tables 5, 6, and 7).  However, 
results for those cases are presented to illustrate empirical implementation of the test. 
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Table 9. Robustness of Support to BT to the Value of α under Alternative Scenarios37   
  # of Tested Values of α  
# of Complete 
Confirmations of 
BT 
Proportion of 
Complete 
Confirmations of 
BT 
# of 
Confirmations of 
the Effects of 
Social 
Aspirations 
Proportion of 
Confirmations of 
the Effects of 
Social 
Aspirations 
# of 
Confirmations of 
the Effects of 
Historical 
Aspirations 
Proportion of 
Confirmations of 
the Effects of 
Historical 
Aspirations 
Tr
ue
 C
au
sa
lit
y RC 14 0 0.000 8 0.571 6 0.429 
BT 14 12 0.857 12 0.857 14 1.000 
Mixed 14 11 0.785 12 0.857 13 0.929 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
37 Robustness of α is investigated in in the range of [0,0.7] with a step of 0.05. A confirmation to BT is considered complete, if all of the specific predictions on the effects of 
aspirations on change (Hypotheses 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B in Greve, 1998) are jointly confirmed. A confirmation of the effects of Social Aspirations obtains, if the predictions on the 
effects of social aspirations on change (Hypotheses 1A and 1B in Greve, 1998) are jointly confirmed. A confirmation of the effects of Historical Aspirations obtains, if the 
predictions on the effects of historical aspirations on change (Hypotheses 2A and 2B in Greve, 1998) are jointly confirmed.  
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Table 10. Summary of Effectiveness of Recommendations 
  
Effective at Eliminating 
Type I Error when Agents Type II Error when Agents 
Satisfice Maximize Mixed Satisfice Maximize Mixed 
Tested Theory RC BT RC BT RC BT RC BT RC BT RC BT 
Recommendation 1: Deliberate Control for 
Maximizing or Satisficing ✔  n.a. n.a. ✔  n.a. n.a. n.a. ✔  ✔  n.a.  ✔  
Recommendation 2: Test of Non-Nested 
Alternative Hypotheses ✔  n.a. n.a. ✔  n.a. n.a. n.a. ✔  ✔  n.a. ✔  ✔  
Recommendation 3: Comparative 
Robustness of Alternative Theories ✔  n.a. n.a. ✔  n.a. n.a. n.a. ✔  ✔  n.a. ✔  ✔  
 
n.a. = not applicable; ✔  denotes instances where recommendations are effective at eliminating errors in tests for the presence of the theory.   
